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Abstract
The structure of natural languages is usually studied from three major dierent but intercon-
nected points of view: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. If we consider that the main purpose of
natural languages is communication, we should explicitly consider another dimension for languages,
which deals with the inuence of internal states of communicating individuals on meanings. Such a
dimension we refer to as internalism. So, pragmatics is assumed to deal with social contexts and its
inuence on meanings. Within this context, internalism cannot be confused with psycholinguistics, in
the same way pragmatics cannot be confused with sociolinguistics. In particular, we argue, language
is tied to its systematic use. This view leads us to a non-realist perspective on linguistics. We analyze
the role of natural languages into dialogues, by comparing our proposal to the dialogical approach to
logic, which considers a dialogue as a game. Within our approach, there is no way to guarantee that
two parties involved in a dialogue are playing the same game, due to unavoidable (and frequently
hidden) dierences in their respective internal states. Another contribution of this paper is to argue
that semantics plays a more fundamental role than syntax in the cognitive acquisition of languages.
Key words: semantics, pragmatics, syntax, internalism
1 Introduction
In order to understand the structure of natural languages, it is usual to split their components into three
major dimensions, namely, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. But other aspects play an important
role into the structure of a language, such as those studied in phonetics, phonology, and morphology.
Sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, dialectology, neurolinguistics, ethnolinguistics, historical linguistics,
and computational linguistics refer to specialized studies for the understanding of the ways in which
languages relate to other disciplines in addition to linguistics.
Nevertheless, before stating the fundamental components that dene the structure of a language, it
is important to be as clear as possible about the philosophical point of view about linguistics that is
adopted. Otherwise, we are condemning ourselves to fragile methodological and epistemological grounds
for linguistics. The delicate equilibrium between linguistics, as a social endeavor of scientic character,
and its epistemological grounds has been a motivation for disturbing discussions about, for example,
\psychological reality" [15, 16, 10].
A realist perspective, for our purposes, considers that the existence of a natural language, dened by
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, is independent of any individual's belief. And a non-realist perspective
considers that a language can exist if and only if there is at least one conscious individual that believes
to grasp a minimal content about such a language (enough for the identication of some of its central
features). That means that any natural language is (at least partially) dened by its user.
In this paper we adopt a non-realist standpoint for linguistics. After all,
 Without communicating agents, there can be no language at all.
 Moreover, we argue throughout the paper, there is no guarantee that two individuals share the
same perceptions and beliefs about the meaning of utterances.
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 Finally, there is a huge variation at all levels of linguistic organization [22], which allows us to be
quite skeptical about the existence of linguistic universals.
In other words, any claim that a natural language is an emerging social phenomenon that exists by
its own merit is unsustainable, at least from a non-realist perspective about linguistics. A good example
that illustrates our thesis is the statement \You know what I mean" (and its cousin \Oh, come on"),
so common in everyday discussions. People appeal to statements like that when, e.g., they suspect to
be misunderstood. That provides grounds for our assumption that the same string may have dierent
semantic values for dierent individuals, according to their respective internal states. On our view,
the use of language requires a state of the mind that may generate the impression that there is an
emerging linguistic phenomenon common to all individuals from a specic group. It is unclear that a
natural language can exist without at least one individual who eectively believes in its existence and
tries to use it for communication purposes, either successfully or not, at least from the point of view
of that individual. Therefore, internal states (such as psychological mental states) should be taken into
consideration if we are trying to understand a human and natural language. The fact that all natural
languages are supposed to be equipped with a semantic counterpart, according to both common sense
and the specialized literature, emerges from a ubiquitous psychological trait, namely, the compulsory
need for meanings to express something [13].
Since we claim that a language can exist if and only if there is at least one conscious individual that
believes to grasp such a language, we are forced to admit that there is exactly one - and one alone -
individual that believes to grasp such a language. Otherwise, we would be forced to admit that two
individuals may share the same language, an hypothesis that contradicts our statement that a language
is dened by its user (even in the case where there is a shared vocabulary). And there is no way to
guarantee that two individuals share the same internal state in order to unavoidably attribute the same
meaning for a given string of that language. Dierent communicating individuals may eventually share
one single vocabulary. But vocabulary is not enough to dene a language, even in the case where syntax
is provided.
Consider the case of mathematics, in which it is sometimes argued that meanings are irrelevant|a
view that is often, albeit not very accurately, attributed to David Hilbert ([21]). It is, of course, dicult to
understand mathematics when one sees no meaning in the mathematical concepts stated by mathematical
languages. And mathematics is easier to understand when one realizes its applicability to the real world,
a world that helps users to see the rich meanings involved. Even pure mathematicians, who often develop
their mathematical theories quite independently of any application, communicate their ideas by using
natural languages. No mathematical paper and no mathematics lecture makes use of formal languages
alone without the support of natural languages. So, meaning is unavoidable in both cases, for the sake
of communication.
Our non-realist view of natural languages is opposed to Saussure's distinction between langue (a
socially shared collection of conventions) and parole (the particular instruments used by a speaker de-
ploying a language) [35]. After all, Saussure's view about linguistics was aected by his own particular
internal states. More generally, linguists talking about natural languages, by using natural languages,
are unavoidably trapped into a particular logical ambush, subject to their own particular internal states
and their own personal perceptions about allegedly shared perceptions on languages and the world. Of
course, the authors of this paper face the same problem. So, for the sake of consistency, only parole is
considered real (with some adjustments), while langue is not.
Chomsky's realist view, on the other hand, is related to his notion of I-language [7, 8], which, based
on Otto Jespersen's ideas [24], is individual, internal, and intentional. I-language denotes linguistic
knowledge, a particular mental or psychological state. The problem this view faces, however, can be
found, e.g., in the following passage [7], p. 22:
Taking language to be I-language, the grammar would then be a theory of the I-language,
which is the object under investigation. And if, indeed, such a \notion of structure" exists,
as Jespersen held, then questions of truth and falsity arise for grammar as they do for any
scientic theory".
A good criticism of this I-language doctrine is oered in some works by Michael Devitt, referred to
above [15, 16]. In what follows, we provide a brief analysis from our non-realist perspective (which, thus,
diers from Devitt's realism). The very notions of truth and falsity rely on meanings, which are treated by
Chomsky as being independent of anyone's beliefs. They are often taken to be unavoidable and inherent
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to any scientic theory. Indeed, on certain views, the notions of truth and falsity guide large portions
of the scientic enterprise [29]. But there are other possible semantic values that can be used even in
the experimental sciences, such as the notion of partial truth [12]. Furthermore, in the case of formal
logic, even the classical propositional calculus is not restricted to only two possible semantic values, but
its formulas may be interpreted in a multi-valued semantics that has nothing to do with truth or falsity
[27]. And returning to the experimental sciences, there are many well-known limits to interpretation
in quantum mechanics [2]. In particular, depending on the interpretation given to quantum mechanics,
dierent quantum states may be simultaneously associated with the same physical system. In other
words, Chomsky's interpretation to the string \scientic theory" is dierent from ours. And dierent
semantics entail dierent natural languages. That is an example of how dicult it is to communicate
ideas through dialogues. More than that, we show here how dicult it is to even understand what a
natural language is.
The success of language as an instrument of exchange of ideas along thousands of years of human
civilizations reinforces everyone's beliefs on the existence of collective beliefs, such as languages, commonly
treated as emerging social phenomena. That entails a conundrum! Suppose Mary says to John that, no
matter what they say to each another, they are never talking the same language. If John unconditionally
agrees with Mary (granting she is right), then he is providing evidence that Mary is wrong. After all,
both of them seem to understand language the same way, since the understanding of what a language
is depends on a semantic value attributed to the string \language". And, if John strongly disagrees
with Mary (stating she is wrong), then he is providing evidence that Mary is right. After all, they seem
to understand language in dierent ways. Besides, if Mary believes that they are not talking the same
language, why is she talking to him anyway? A possible solution to this epistemological problem is
provided in section 3.
Nevertheless, despite all the successes of language, the very existence of multiple interpretations for the
same text (such as in the case of philosophical exegeses, so common in literature) reveals that something
odd may be going on with natural languages. Even the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge
as justied true belief is strongly supported by subjective perceptions about knowledge: belief is an
introspective state, including the belief on justication and truth. So, within our perspective about this
traditional view, knowledge is a belief supported by other beliefs. Within this context, one could ask:
Why is the tripartite analysis of knowledge a problem about language rather than a problem about the
concept of knowledge (since the tripartite analysis requires belief but not necessarily belief in justication
and truth)? Our answer is this: any problem about the concept of knowledge is a problem which depends
on the language used to formulate such concept. Otherwise, there wouldn't be so many interpretations
on the philosophical literature about concepts like truth and justication. That is why in this paper we
examine both successes and failures of dialogues within the very same framework.
In addition to non-realism, we adopt the philosophical point of view that there are interferences on
meanings associated with utterances, caused not just by context, but also by unknown elements lurking
among those who communicate. A mathematician may understand the meaning of the string \mathemat-
ics" in a rather dierent way than a person who does not have any formal training in mathematics. That's
because the internal state of a mathematician is dierent from the internal state of a non-mathematician.
Actually, such a dierence is supported even by cognitive neuroscience [1]. More than that, the internal
state of a mathematician may be a complete mystery for, e.g., a lawyer. And that is a very relevant
feature on the eective use of languages, supported by compelling evidence, as we shall see along the
paper. An example much less radical than this (a quite simple dialogue about the safety of a car) is
provided in section 3 to illustrate such interferences.
In this sense, we consider that internal states of communicating individuals (which include previous
personal experiences and even psychological traits) are indispensable components of natural languages,
due to its eects on the interpretations attributed to utterances. Internal states interfere on semantics.
That is the rationale that explains why we prefer to split natural languages into four dimensions: syntax,
semantics, pragmatics, and internalism.
Pragmatics could be roughly understood as the study of the concrete use of natural languages by
communicating agents. That notion encompasses a large spectrum of questions that are supposed to be
answered by pragmatics, which include social and individual circumstances, actions and even intentions.
In this sense, pragmatics copes with every linguistic issue that does not concern semantics or syntax. For
our purposes, we need to restrict the concept of pragmatics, in order to enlarge the spectrum of questions
that linguistics should answer, at least from our non-realist perspective.
Pragmatics, in our approach, is the study of the ways in which social context contributes to meaning.
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In other words, pragmatics deals with shared elements and experiences among interlocutors that interfere
on meanings. Contexts interfere on meanings while interpretations of uttered strings help to develop
social contexts. So, pragmatics is entangled with semantics. Nevertheless, even in the case of shared
experiences (stimuli), people understand contexts in dierent ways, according to their internal states,
which depend on previous personal experiences, cognitive capabilities, and emotional skills and states.
One good example is the movie \Small Time Crooks", written and directed by Woody Allen. The main
character is known as \Brain" among his former cell mates. This character understands his nickname
as a compliment, although his friends were just ironic about that. The audience laughs because their
internal state diers from Woody Allen's character. Without the internal counterpart of languages we
propose, there would be less humour in the world, maybe none. So, we are taking jokes very seriously
here.
We adopt an empiricist view about the physical world, in the sense that we admit the existence
of a real world formed by the environment and communicating agents, independently on their beliefs.
That is why we are keeping the pragmatic dimension of natural languages. Contexts are real and may be
physically and emotionally felt. But languages emerge from individual internal states, stimulated by social
contexts, nothing else. Languages rely on individual internal states that can be physically manifested
by communicating individuals who produce sounds, inscriptions and signals in general, including body
language. But the interpretation of those sounds and inscriptions has nothing to do with any natural
language if there is no one to interpret them. And if there is no interpretation, then there is no semantics.
If there is no semantics, there is no natural language.
Since communication is paramount in our framework for natural languages, we have no choice but
to discuss concrete dialogues (dialogues in natural languages). And dialogues are usually treated as a
game, within a dialogical approach to logic [31]. Our main point is that there is no systematic way to
guarantee that two interlocutors engaged in the same dialogue are playing the same game, due to the
introspective character of natural languages. Nevertheless we are still able to endow natural languages
with epistemological grounds by means of a convergence principle for meanings. The idea is quite simple,
although extremely general. The longer an uttered string, the narrower is its corresponding set of possible
meanings. If an interlocutor feels that any hope for convergence of meanings is impossible, then a new
dialogue should get started.
In the next section we recall and discuss some basic mathematical concepts which are necessary for
the development of our proposal. The syntax of a natural language may be mathematically provided by
means of algebraic concepts which may be considered common to two or more interlocutors. That is why
we need this mathematical discussion. In section 3 we introduce our non-realistic approach for natural
languages, with special emphasis on the principle of convergence for semantics. We analyse our ideas from
the perspective of dialogical logic principles applied to concrete dialogues, which are mathematical tools
briey discussed in section 2, as pre-requisite. In section 4 we show how syntax is built from semantics.
In section 5 we justify why natural languages are successful on everyday usage and how they can be a
frustrating failure when two interlocutors have considerable dierences in their respective internal states.
In the last section we close this paper with nal remarks and some open problems.
2 The Mathematics of Natural Languages
There are many mathematical models and theories for the study of natural languages [4, 5, 6, 17, 20,
39]. But we are particularly interested on two mathematical proposals. Our starting point for the
understanding of natural languages is the formal language of a set theory, for example, NBG [27]. Let
A be a nite set, called alphabet . The set of all words, or strings (nite sequences) of elements of A, is
denoted by A. A set-theoretical language L on A is any non-empty subset of A. We can understand
the juxtaposition of words as a binary operation + on A, such that + is associative. In this sense, A
endowed with + is a free semigroup, where the empty word ; (the empty word always belongs to L) is
the neutral element with respect to +. For the sake of abbreviation, if there is no risk of confusion, we
say that L is a set-theoretic language if there is an alphabet A such that L is a set-theoretic language on
A.
In a very broad sense, a semantics of any set-theoretic language L is a correspondence from all strings
of L to subsets of elements of a non-empty domain  such that the intersection L\ is empty. In other
words, a semantics of L is a function s : L ! }(), where  6= ;, L \ = ;, and }() is the set of all
subsets of . Usually, s is not surjective. s is the semantic function and  is the domain of all possible
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meanings.
For example, consider a set-theoretic language L such that ;, \delicious", \green", \apple", \greenap-
ple", and \deliciousgreenapple" belong to L. In this case,
green + apple = greenapple;
due to the way + is dened, as a juxtaposition of words. And
delicious + (green + apple) = (delicious + green) + apple = deliciousgreenapple;
due to the associativity property of +.
This algebraic model for set-theoretic languages is quite interesting from a historical point of view.
The history of written languages conrms that most ancient European texts were written in scriptura
continua (continuous script), without spaces between words. That was the usual practice from The
Iliad to religious manuscripts of the seventh century. Exceptions may be found among ancient Hebrew
manuscripts and the earliest Greek papyri. But on those cases, separation between words was a practical
issue, since those texts have words with no vowels [34].
The introduction of spacing between words, capital letters, punctuation, paragraphs, itemization,
apostrophe, and other auxiliary symbols for clarifying meaning was a social practice evolution that
contributed to the common belief that languages are emerging social phenomena that may exist by their
own merit. Nevertheless, such a social evolution establishes only that natural languages are much more
than just set-theoretic languages.
Natural languages can be aected by social contexts. That's because social contexts aect individ-
ual beliefs, while individual beliefs less frequently aect social contexts throughout the use of natural
languages. One good example is the fact that one single individual's belief on unicorns (in the sense of
interpreting the string \unicorn" as a real horse with a single large, pointed, spiraling horn projecting
from its forehead) does not necessarily entail that a whole community will interpret the string \unicorn"
in the same way.
Concerning semantics, if  is a string from L, then s()  , where s is the semantic function dened
above. This means that s() is the set of all possible meanings that an individual is able to accept for
string , according to its internal state. In this paper we use the symbols  and  to denote subset and
proper subset, respectively. For example, consider the string \bed" from the set-theoretic language L
associated with English. The word \bed" may be interpreted as any real bed that existed, exists or will
exist. Actually, the word \bed" may be interpreted even as an imaginary bed, such as the plastic bed
where Alexander, the Great, slept every night during a military campaign (plastic was invented in the
19th century and Alexander, the Great, died more than two thousands years before that). Furthermore,
the word \bed" may be interpreted as the abstract category of all beds and even as a bed in a extended
sense, such as a bedrock. This quite simple example illustrates just partially the magnicent ambiguities
in natural languages. That is another reason to approach such languages from a non-realist perspective.
Dierent individuals have dierent internal states. They may believe that they share a particular belief.
And if two individuals engaged in a dialogue believe that both share the same natural language, they
may eventually believe that they agree with each another (or disagree). But there is no guarantee that
such beliefs are true, since there is no third party (a meta-judge) that knows all about their respective
internal states. In order to narrow possible interpretations for a given string , new strings are supposed
to be juxtaposed to , thus forming longer strings.
When any individual I either receives or transmits a string , in a dialogue situation, one single
element from s() is chosen by I, according to its internal state. That choice may be changed as long
the dialogue proceeds. But that change will just replace one element from s() for another element from
s() in the case of a dialogue that provides no learning experience. And more than that, dialogues may
eventually allow either a new possible meaning for  to be added to s() or an old possible meaning for 
to be removed from s(). That is a learning experience. Learning is a particular process of belief change.
At this point it is worth to remark that our proposal cannot be confused with the notion of alternative
semantics rooted in the work of Charles Leonard Hamblin [9]. It is true that the semantic value of a
string, in Hamblin semantics, is a whole set of objects. Nevertheless, Hamblin work was motivated by
uttered questions in a language, like English. And our proposal considers a much bigger set s() of
all possible meanings (recognizable by a communicating individual) associated to any string  of an
individual's natural language. Thus, in a way, our ideas are considerably more radical than Hamblin's.
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Since, for every utterance , internal states dene s() as well the choice of a specic element of s()
(for dialogue purposes), a lot of investigation is required to understand how internal states actually work.
Another mathematical aspect that is relevant in this paper can be found in the historically traditional
view of logic as the systematic study of dialogues, which has given birth to dialogical logic. Modern
dialogical logic uses concepts of game theory in order to provide a semantics for a wide range of logical
systems. Dialogues are simply games where what is at stake is a formula, a string in a formal language.
Based on these historical roots, dialogues (in a purely formal framework) are useful instruments for
studying, comparing, and combining dierent formal logics [33]. But in addition to the use of game-
theoretic concepts for studying formal logics, there has been an eort to use similar ideas in concrete
dialogues that occur in natural languages. One of these attempts is due to Henry Prakken [31], which
provides a good review of previous literature dealing with dialogue games, from medieval times to articial
intelligence.
Prakken follows a way similar to L. Carlson [3] and others, by assuming coherence. Coherence refers,
simply put, to the goal of a dialogue. In other words [31]:
[T]he principles governing the meaning and use of utterances should not be dened at the
level of individual speech acts but at the level of the dialogue in which the utterance is made.
This justies why most work on argumentation dialogues, like Carlson, takes a game-theoretic
approach to dialogues, where speech acts are viewed as moves in a game and rules for their
appropriateness are formulated as rules of the game.
But Prakken himself recognizes that his approach may \be less suited for dialogues where the focus
is more on investigation or deliberation than on settling a conict of opinion".
The point we make here is that any assumption of coherence in dialogues implicitly entails a realist
view of natural languages. And that assumption is something we intend to avoid. It is hard to square
realism with linguistic matters, since there hardly are universals in linguistics [22]. Even in conicts of
opinion, it is not dicult for any of us to recall hopeless discussions among intransigent people. Emotions
and other internal states play a substantial role on how people understand what they hear and even what
they say.
3 An Alternative Approach: Internalism
Our proposal is the introduction of internalism as a fourth dimension in natural languages, in addition
to syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Internalism is the study of the ways in which internal states of
communicating individuals contribute to meaning. More explicitly, we have:
1. A quasi-natural language is an ordered triple L = hL;; si, where L is a set-theoretic language,
and  and s are the concepts discussed in Section 2.
2. If someone believes that a quasi-natural language L may be used for communication purposes (in an
intuitive sense), then L is a natural language. In order to an individual believe that a quasi-natural
language L = hL;; si may be used for communication purposes, it is necessary and sucient
that s() 6= ; for any  that belongs to L. In other words, all strings of a natural language have
meanings.
3. Natural languages are created by individuals for the purpose of communication (concrete dialogues),
although they may be used for introspective and solitary activities, such as monologues.
4. Meaning is an introspective process in which an individual develops its own semantic function s.
In this sense, the semantic function may change as time goes by.
5. Meaning depends on the internal state of the interlocutor in a dialogue. That internal state is
dened by previous personal experiences, cognitive capabilities, and emotional skills and states.
How does the dynamics of a concrete dialogue work between two individuals I and J?
Steps Every dialogue is dened by steps. A step starts with an utterance  transmitted from interlocutor
I to interlocutor J and stops with the response  uttered by interlocutor J . The next step starts
with  previously uttered by J and ends with the response  uttered by I, and so on. Each utterance
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is a string of a set-theoretic language associated with a natural language, which is particular to each
interlocutor. As long as the dialogue proceeds, those steps have a cumulative eect, generating new
strings +  +  that are bigger or equal in size, compared to the previous step + . The size of
a string is dened by the number of occurrences of elements of the vocabulary of the individual's
set-theoretic language. If both I and J share the same set-theoretic language L, then there is no
problem to juxtapose strings uttered by dierent communicating individuals. Nevertheless, if I and
J do not share the same set-theoretic language L, there can be a problem. Within our approach,
the operation + is dened for a particular set-theoretic language. So, if I utters  and J responds
, in a situation where  does not belong to the set-theoretic language LI of I, then I changes
its set-theoretic language LI in order to accommodate  as an element that can be juxtaposed to
, but sI( + ) = ;, i.e.,  is meaningless for I. This means that the quasi-natural language
LI = hLI [ fg;; si is not the natural language of interlocutor I. In that case, the dialogue ends
and I and J should start a new dialogue (in a way that either both I and J avoid  or I grants
non-empty meanings sI() and sI(+ ).
Meanings Each string  transmitted by I and received by J during a concrete dialogue between I
and J (we are ignoring communication noise) is unconsciously associated with vast domains of
possible meanings sI() and sJ(), respectively. sI() and sJ() work as data banks that provide
all possible meanings to , according to the internal states of I and J and to the ways they both
perceive the shared social context during the dialogue. Such personal experiences concatenated to
social context help to build internal states. Nevertheless only one possible meaning mI 2 sI()
is consciously chosen by I and only one possible meaning mJ 2 sI() is consciously chosen by J ,
during a step of a concrete dialogue. If mI = mJ , then we may have grounds for believing that
both interlocutors are talking similar (in some sense) natural languages. Nevertheless, within a
non-realist view of natural languages, there is no unquestionable way to guarantee that mI = mJ .
The most we can do is to believe that both I and J believe to be talking similar languages and
about the same thing. A more rened view of our proposal should consider the possibility that mI
and mJ are sets of objects (proper subsets of sI() and sJ (), respectively), like what happens in
Hamblin semantics [9]. But that is a task we prefer to explore in the future.
Convergence The bigger the string , the narrower is its corresponding set s() of all possible meanings
for , provided that s() is never empty. Eventually either I or J may reconsider the choice for
mI 2 sI() and mJ 2 sJ (), as long mI and mJ belong to sI() and sJ(), respectively. So, as a
concrete dialogue evolves through its steps (by accumulating bigger strings, according to the rst
item Steps), less options are available for possible meanings. We call this the principle of convergence
for semantics. That is a feature that is supposed to be common to all natural languages. In a non-
realist view of language, as we propose, a convergence principle is fundamentally needed, since the
main goal of natural languages is to allow communication among individuals, by narrowing possible
meanings for a given string . The main purpose of natural languages is to develop individual
beliefs into a collective belief. Otherwise, the purpose of communication would be hopeless. If
there is no convergence for either I or J , then we have no dialogue at all. In this case, all we have
is a sequence of utterances.
Here is an example of a hypothetical concrete dialogue between one of us (the authors) and you
(the reader). Let us say that I say out loud the string \Mother" to you, by employing usual English
pronunciation. What is the rst meaning that crosses your mind, when you hear \Mother"? Now consider
a longer string, let us say, \Mother of Hitler". What do you make of this new string? What does it mean
for you? Finally, consider the new longer string \Mother of Hitler is the name of my dog".
When you rst heard the phrase \Mother", in this hypothetical dialogue, you probably thought about
your own mother. If you are a mother yourself, it is even probable that you thought about yourself. I
seriously doubt you consciously thought about, e.g., Albert Einstein's mother. But when you read the
longer string \Mother of Hitler", you reconsidered your interpretation to something else. It is possible
that you thought of Adolf Hitler's mother, even if you do not know who Klara Polzl was. That's because
sreader(Mother) allows the possibility that I was talking about the mother of Hitler. You may have not
thought about this before. But you admitted the possibility, at least unconsciously. That is because
you believe, by means of your internal state, that even Adolf Hitler had a mother. Nevertheless, when I
nally completed my sentence with the cumulative string \Mother of Hitler is the name of my dog", a new
meaning pops up in your mind. Now you probably believe that the string \Mother of Hitler is the name
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of my dog" has little or nothing to do with your mother or yourself. But one thing is for sure: if you ever
admitted the possibility that I never heard the name \Hitler" before, now that interpretation for anything
I say in the future is simply eliminated. So, the set sreader(Mother of Hitler is the name of my dog) has
less elements than the set sreader(Mother). That's the principle of convergence for semantics in action.
Now let us consider an example of concrete dialogue previously examined by Prakken [31]. We are
keeping the parenthesis with observations made by Prakken himself.
Paul: My car is very safe. (making a claim)
Olga: Why is your car safe? (asking grounds for a claim)
Paul: Since it has an airbag, (oering grounds for a claim)
Olga: That is true, (conceding a claim) but I disagree that this makes your car safe: the newspapers
recently reported on airbags expanding without cause. (stating a counterargument)
Paul: Yes, that is what the newspapers say (conceding a claim) but that does not prove anything,
since newspaper reports are very unreliable sources of technological information. (undercutting a
counterargument)
Olga: Still your car is not safe, since its maximum speed is very high. (alternative counterargument)
According to Prakken, the persuasion dialogue given above \illustrates that players may return to
earlier choices and move alternative replies". That statement is grounded on the idea that \in the course
of a dialogue the participants implicitly build a logical structure of arguments and counterarguments
relevant to the dialogue topic". This common logical structure is, for Prakken, a nonmonotonic logic. It
is worth to recall that a nonmonotonic logic is a kind of logic in which interlocutors draw risky but plausible
conclusions, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. We consider here that
the very notions of a \common logic" between interlocutors and of a \dialogue topic" are unsound, from
a non-realist perspective about natural languages. After all, Olga could be just determined to be against
any idea of Paul. And that kind of reasoning could entail a monotonic logic associated to her, according
to her own beliefs. Besides, while Paul could be talking about his car, Olga could be meaning Paul
instead, even when she explicitly talks about Paul's car. This kind of masquerade is not unusual among
arguing people.
What really happened in the dialogue exemplied by Prakken? Well, we have no idea. But we can
point a couple of possibilities out, based on our non-realistic view for natural languages. In this case we
have a ve steps dialogue.
Scenario I For abbreviation sake, we denote Paul's statements as 1, 2 and 3. Olga's statements are
denoted by 1, 2 and 3.
Step 1: No matter what, Paul believes his car is very safe (since it has an airbag system that
none of his previous cars ever had) and states that belief in a way he believes it is faithful to what
he thinks about his car. The rst claim is 1, namely, \My car is very safe". Olga hears Paul's
statement 1 and she chooses one single possible interpretation, extracted from a vast myriad of
possible interpretations: \Paul believes that his car is safe". That interpretation can be partially
explained by means of a social context! That is pragmatics in action, since it is not just the
sentence that is taken into account for interpretation purposes, but also who said that. Then
Olga's internal state and 1 trigger her memory. Olga recalls that her notions about safety are
more rigorous than Paul's (based on previous discussions with him), and she decides to ask grounds
for his claim. She states a string she believes to be faithful to what she wants to show him (not
about Paul's car, but about Paul's notions on safety). The rst string uttered by Olga is 1. The
topic of conversation is a car's safety, for Paul, but it is Paul's view about any car's safety, for
Olga. There is no common topic in dispute here. Hence, they are not playing the same game.
Nevertheless, they are both players. Moreover, sPaul(1) unconsciously admitted the possibilities
that Olga may doubt him, that Olga may unconditionally believe him and that Olga may believe
him if he provides some grounds. When Olga uttered 1, then we have sPaul(1+1)  sPaul(1).
That's because sPaul(1 + 1) has at least one less element than sPaul(1). The missing element
in sPaul(1+1) is at least the interpretation that \Olga believes him with no doubt whatsoever".
And the missing element in sOlga(1+1) (by comparing to sOlga(1)) is at least the interpretation
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that \Paul learned something about cars safety since their last discussion about this topic". That
is the convergence principle in action.
Step 2: Paul hears Olga's question 1 and keeps his unconditional belief on his car's safety, since
his reasoning about the safety of his car has a monotonic character. Paul does not realize that it is
his particular standards of safety that are being questioned by Olga. But he realizes that 1 was not
informative enough, due to Olga's question 1. That happens because his internal state is strongly
focused on his car. By keeping the exact previous component of internal state (concerning his car) he
had in the beginning of this concrete dialogue, Paul simply adds a new string 2 that he consciously
believes should be enough to guarantee the convergence of the rst statements juxtaposed, in a way
he considers to be obviously true. The new string 2 is \Since it has an airbag". That is clearly
an additional information that is supposed to narrow possible interpretations for his rst statement
(1) juxtaposed to Olga's inquiry (1). In other words, sPaul(1 + 1 + 2) is a proper subset of
sPaul(1+1). sOlga(1+1+2) is also a proper subset of sOlga(1+1). The missing element in
sOlga(1+1+2) is at least that \now Paul thinks carefully before answering to critical questions
about any car's safety". That is the principle of convergence for semantics in action again.
Step 3: But Olga's internal state also searches for a convergence of meanings of her own. Her
monotonic internal logic is still focused on Paul's views about safety. That's why she remembers
about newspapers recently reporting on airbags malfunction. That memory is part of her internal
state. So, she states 2: \That is true, but I disagree that this makes your car safe: the newspapers
recently reported on airbags expanding without cause". Olga is not conceding any claim about
safety, since she believes that airbags are not enough to guarantee safety. She is conceding the claim
that Paul's car has an airbag. Olga is determined to show that Paul does not know what he is talking
about. The missing element in sPaul(1 + 1 +2 + 2) is at least the interpretation that \Olga is
careful about newspapers reports on technology", and the missing element in sOlga(1+1+2+2)
is at least the interpretation that \Paul reads newspapers reports about airbags and he believes in
such reports". One could argue that one missing element in sOlga(1+1+2+2) should be that
\Paul is aware of newspapers reports about airbags". That possible interpretation could even be a
conscious belief from Olga. Nevertheless, her personal experience, in this rst scenario, denes an
internal state that admits the possibility that Paul is aware of such reports, but he does not care
for them. So, conscious beliefs are not enough to probe internal states.
Step 4: Paul hears Olga's claim about newspapers but he believes that that information adds
nothing to their discussion. She could be talking about elephants in Africa for all that matters.
That is because Paul does not believe in any newspaper, when the subject is technology. So, Paul
utters 2: \Yes, that is what the newspapers say but that does not prove anything, since newspaper
reports are very unreliable sources of technological information". In other words, Paul is enchanted
enough by his car to the point that his internal state guarantees that sPaul(1+1+2+2+3) 
sPaul(1 + 1 + 2 + 2). The missing element in sPaul(1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3) is at least the
interpretation that \Olga was aware that he does not care about newspapers reports on technology".
And the missing element in sOlga(1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3) is at least the interpretation that \Paul
can learn about airbags from a newspaper".
Step 5: Olga draws her last card to convince Paul that his vision on safety is too relaxed for
her taste. She utters 3: \Still your car is not safe, since its maximum speed is very high".
Paul consciously interprets 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 3 as \My car is safe because it has airbag.
But Olga talks nonsense and she thinks I like to drive at maximum speed." In other words,
sPaul(1+ 1+2+ 2+3+ 3)  sPaul(1+ 1+2+ 2). There are convergence of meanings
for both Paul and Olga, although they are both stubborn and do not agree with each another. All
respective missing elements mentioned above, and much more, are unconsciously present in both
sPaul(1) and sOlga(1).
Scenario II For the sake of shortness we present a less detailed scenario here, just in order to illustrate
another possibility for internal states.
Step 1: Paul believes, for the moment, that his car is safe. So, he claims 1. Olga hears it and
she gets intrigued. That is because Olga wishes to know if she should buy a car like Paul's. So, she
replies 1.
Step 2: Paul understands how vague is 1 and interprets 1 + 1 as \my car is safe and she is
interested in a car like mine". In other words, sPaul(1 + 1) is a proper subset of sPaul(1). He
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decides to help her, and then he replies 2. That is a moment where both Paul and Olga are talking
about the same topic, namely, \Olga wishes to decide if a car like Paul's is safe for her".
Step 3: Olga hears 2 but she is not convinced, since she remembered about reports on airbags
malfunction. This means that sOlga(1 + 1 + 2)  sOlga(1). Since she seeks for a convergence
of her own, she utters 2.
Step 4: Paul interprets 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3 in a way that sPaul(1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3) 
sPaul(1 + 1 + 2 + 2). The missing element in sPaul(1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3) is that \Olga was
aware that he does not care about newspapers reports on technology". So, he replies 3.
Step 5: Olga is oended, since she started to work at a newspaper. She replies 3. Paul consciously
interprets 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 3 as \My car is safe because it has airbag. But Olga talks
nonsense because she likes to drive at maximum speed."
Many other scenarios could be illustrated. But the pictures we illustrated here should be enough to
show that convergence is a natural, but unconscious, phenomenon in a concrete dialogue. If convergence
on meanings (to a non-empty meaning) is felt impossible by any interlocutor, then a new dialogue should
get started. That happens when one of the interlocutors reaches some inconsistency such that the set of
all possible meanings for a string is empty. In that case the string is meaningless.
So, what is our solution to the Mary and John conundrum stated in section 1? If Mary and John have
some personal linguistic experiences in common, they may eventually believe to share similar languages.
That is what allows them to juxtapose strings in a dialogue, like the example given above, of Olga and
Paul. So, it is even possible that two parties involved in a dialogue converge their personal meanings
to the same interpretation. If sMary() = sJohn(), for some cumulated string  in a dialogue, and
mMary = mJohn (wheremMary 2 sMary() andmJohn 2 sJohn()), then we have a guaranteed agreement
between Mary and John, without any apparent paradox. But besides the fact we cannot guarantee such
equalities, there is the problem that the string  corresponds to just a small fraction of their respective
languages. On the other hand, if sMary() = sJohn(), for some cumulated string  in a dialogue,
and mMary 6= mJohn, then we have a partial or conditional agreement between Mary and John. If
sMary() 6= sJohn(), for some cumulated string  in a dialogue, and mMary = mJohn, then we have a
complete agreement between both, but for dierent reasons. If sMary() 6= sJohn(), for some cumulated
string  in a dialogue, and mMary 6= mJohn, we have total disagreement. If sMary() \ sJohn() = ;, for
some cumulated string  in a dialogue, then we have mutual misunderstanding between both. That is
the case where two people have grounds to believe not to be talking the same language at all.
So, the natural principle of convergence for semantics is a deep motivation for people searching
a collective convergence of meanings during a dialogue. And this search for convergence reects the
intrinsic desire to be understood and to understand. It is a desire which presents some remarkable
features from a psychological point of view. One of them is the use of gestures to speak. Most people
gesture during a dialogue. Even congenitally blind people gesture when they speak [23]. That's because
the need for gestures is intrinsic among people. We interpret that as an intrinsic recognition from all of us
that spoken natural languages are not enough to allow mutual understanding, to guarantee convergence.
The special symbols used in written languages and mentioned in section 2 (capital letters, punctuation,
itemization and so on) are the equivalent of gestures in spoken natural languages: they are tools to
improve convergence of meanings, with the intrinsic hope that the same convergence applies to each and
every individual involved in a concrete dialogue.
4 Syntax and Semantics
Within our approach, semantics is more fundamental than syntax. That goes against the mainstream
concept of Universal Grammar (in the sense of an innate knowledge of grammar), where its followers
claim that the use of grammar is the most essential of all human qualities [7, 28, 30]. Criticisms to this
view may be found, e.g., in [16, 37]. Actually, the search for hard evidences for the Universal Grammar
hypothesis has reached genetics [19]. Nevertheless, such evidences are still inconclusive [40, 25, 36]. Our
proposal is more consonant with Wolfram Hinzen's view about linguistics [22]:
Throughout its long history, the project of a science of grammar has always been an inherently
philosophical one, in which the study of grammar was taken to have special epistemological
signicance. I ask why 20th and 21st century inquiry into Universal Grammar (UG) has largely
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lost this dimension, a fact that I argue is partially responsible for the prevailing controversy
around UG, relating to its formulation, scope, and biological basis.
According to Hinzen \There are no linguistic universals: universal grammar is refuted by abundant
variation at all levels of linguistic organization, which lies at the heart of human faculty of language".
Children give their rst steps into dialogues by learning very specic words, like \dad", \mom",
\food", \dog", and \toy". They hear those strings, and the social context (pragmatics) associated to
their internal state (internalism) helps them to reason in an inductive fashion (it is an abstraction process
in action) in order to associate meanings to strings: \dad" corresponds to dad and \mom" corresponds
to mom. If the child says \mom dad", the social context dened by mom and dad will eventually correct
the child by saying \mom and dad". And so the child is able to learn two new linguistic concepts: the
meaning of \and" and some syntax. If the child says \mom dad and", her parents will reply: \mom
and dad". From a purely grammatical point of view, there is nothing wrong with \mom dad and". The
connective \and" may be understood as an operator that can be applied to strings, allowing us to get new
strings. So, the syntax of the use of \and" is quite arbitrary, and not universal. Consider, for example,
the case of a Hewlett-Packard calculator, which employs the reverse Polish notation (RPN) for basic
operations between numbers. According to RPN, if we want to add 2 and 3 we write this as \2 3 +".
In the usual notation, we simply say \2 + 3". If syntax is arbitrary, so is grammar. After all, one single
language may be generated by as many grammars as we wish [38]. So, when the child's parents correct
her by saying \mom and dad" instead of \mom dad and" or \and mom dad", this correction is not in
the sense that \mom dad and" and \and mom dad" are false statements or wrongly said. Rather than
that, those strings are simply meaningless in dad's and mom's natural languages. So, mom and dad hope
their child develops a natural language where those same statements are meaningless as well. That's how
semantics builds a natural language's syntax! That happens by means of a close relationship between
internal states and stimuli (pragmatics).
The human ability to cope with natural languages certainly has genetic grounds [25], but not in the
sense of a universal grammar gene programmed by millions of years of evolution. The grammar gene
hypothesis is simply unnecessary and even unsound, at least in a non-realist perspective for natural
languages. Human unique skills to use natural languages have more to do with memory (people store
and, more or less, retrieve information regarding personal experiences, feelings, vocabulary and meanings),
juxtaposition of strings (in a recursive way), stimuli, and the principle of convergence for semantics stated
in section 3.
5 Successes and Failures of Concrete Dialogues
From a social point of view, the success of natural languages, as useful tools for communication, can be
partially explained through the process of language acquisition illustrated in the last section. Children
naturally trust their parents and so they develop natural languages similar to their mom and dad natural
languages. And mom and dad live in a social environment where they need to feel included, for survival
purposes. So, it is the human need (an intrinsic desire) for sociability that helps to develop individual
natural languages with so much in common, at the point to make it believable that there is indeed
one single natural language common to all people from a given community. And this search for social
inclusion works with minor problems for very basic everyday needs, like food, shelter, safety, health, and
even entertainment.
Major problems arise when one single individual (or a little group) tries to interfere with other people
ways of perception about more complex and less familiar issues, like what happens in religion, politics,
science, education, arts, literature, philosophy, and history studies. That's where natural languages more
frequently fail as communication tools. How can we guarantee that two players in a dialogue are playing
the same game? One well known example that the dialogical approach to dialogues is inadequate is
the Azande, an ethnic group of North Central Africa, whose beliefs in witchcraft have been motive for
debate (see [11] and references). The Azande do not revise their beliefs on witchcraft even when they are
confronted by contradictions that are pointed out to them. One possible approach to this problem is to
admit that Zande (adjective for Azande) reasoning is a paraconsistent logic [11]. Another way to cope
with this problem is to recognize that natural languages are grounded on pragmatics and internalism.
Social contexts and inner states dene semantic values. And when natural languages are used by religious
leaders in a social group with little contact to other cultures, this social group develops a way of its own
to understand utterances and reason about them. It is rather dicult to guarantee mutual agreement
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between a Zande witch and a western researcher, if the subject is witchcraft. The possible meanings for
logical operators like conditionals, among Azande, may be quite dierent from the possible meanings for
conditionals among western researchers. In order to anyone be able to talk and reason like an Azande it
is necessary to practically become an Azande.
The very notions of falsity and truth are historically built in natural languages of most human cultures,
and are commonly mistaken as agreement and disagreement, respectively. Since any natural language
is a state of the mind, when an individual says that a given statement (string) is true, that means that
this individual agrees with whoever (even itself) uttered such a sentence. That is why so many people
still claim that the Earth is at! Indeed, there are hard evidences against a at Earth hypothesis. But
there is no hard evidence that all people understand the same claim the same way. One thing is to talk
about the Earth. Another thing is to talk about the languages we use to talk about the Earth. Without
natural languages there would be neither truth nor falsity. The physical world exists independently of any
natural language. The notions of truth and falsity depend on a fundamental level on natural languages.
But there are worst situations that illustrate the limits of natural languages. Quantum mechanics
is an excellent example. It is not easy for most people to understand what does it mean to say that
Schrodinger's cat is dead and alive [18]. A sentence like that is neither true nor false, for most people.
It is just meaningless. And even quantum physicists work with this kind of natural language with some
diculty.
Jane Austin (Pride and Prejudice) wrote \It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in
possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife". This famous quotation summarizes our view in
a poetic form. Man and wife look for a convergence of meanings, through language, at a point to believe
in some kind of universal truth. And even so, man and wife are still struggling for mutual understanding.
Jane Austin seemed to understand that quite well. After all, the cited quotation has an ironic and playful
tone during the reading of her famous novel.
6 Final Remarks
Since syntax rules may be derived from semantics, it seems reasonable to consider only three dimensions
for natural languages, once provided an alphabet: semantics, pragmatics and internalism. People talk
because they wish to be understood, they wish to achieve a convergence into a specic non-empty meaning.
That convergence naturally happens in the mind of who talks and is wished to be achieved in the mind
of whoever is listening.
Nevertheless, we recognize that this paper presents a vast myriad of fundamental problems to be
solved:
1. How precisely do internal states work in the development of natural languages as tools for concrete
dialogues? The answer to that question depends on answering the next one.
2. How can we get reliable information about all internal states of a communicating individual without
depending on dialogues with such an individual? Nowadays people talk to machines (like, for
example, the one provided by www.cleverbot.com) without knowing their softwares. Any approach
to understand the internal states of a talking machine must go beyond simple conversations. And
an analogous remark can be done with regard to talking people.
3. Is it possible to conceive a natural and useful language that guarantees the same convergence for
two or more individuals' semantics?
4. Our principle of convergence for semantics, stated in section 3, is too general. A much more rened
principle is demanded if we want to fully understand our approach in a testable way. Nevertheless,
in order to achieve this goal, we need rst to answer questions 1 and 2.
5. There have been reported experimental evidences that some neurons in the temporal cortex of
the human brain are highly selective for object categories such as faces and hands [14] and even
specic people [32]. Such results inspired the creation of a software capable to build high-level,
class-specic feature detectors from unlabeled images [26]. The main result in [26] was that such
a software was able to identify (from a database of images) cat faces and human bodies without
the need for any programmer to label which images were supposed to contain faces or bodies. In
other words, machines are potentially able to create object categories, just as the human brain does.
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According to the terminology of the authors in [26], their software \learns the concept of faces".
Such object categories can be partially identied with internal states of either human beings or even
machines. Nevertheless, there is an important dierence between people and computers. A human
being internal state is far richer and more sophisticated than the internal state of a machine, by
including information with no visual appeal and even emotions. Nevertheless, we question if it is
not possible to conceive machines that learn to talk by following some constrained version of our
proposed principle of convergence for semantics. In other words, can a machine learn that the word
\cat" may be associated to the object category \cat", without human intervention?
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